As always the article is available for download as a Word-document on the final page (p. 11)

FOURTH QUARTER 2003:
November 20th

2:11

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ark og ulandskr201103-3.htm

 

 

 

 

 

 

What Europe Turns its Back On

People tend to overlook their own faults, like the rampant corruption in the French political elite: it’s a very selective memory?

KR: They often like to criticize the American social and racial problems without looking at their own. And I tell them: have you ever been to the banlieue in Paris, have you seen how you treat your Arab and Moslem population? That’s just as bad as any ghetto in America. They ignore the social problems here, but like to point out the problems in the US. I pick up Le Monde every day, but I rarely see articles really exploring the depth of Arab anger in the ghettoes in the Parisian suburbs, the lack of Arab faces in represented in Parliament, in the government, in television, in the media here. I never see these issues discussed in newspapers like Le Monde. So they have a huge problem here they don’t address. It’s a lot easier to criticize America than to look at their own problems.

In the war on terror you might say Americans and Europeans have divergent perceptions of the gravity of the threat. Are these differences, the threat perceptions and the differences evoked above, linked to each other?

KR: I think they are two different things. On the war on terror, the Europeans and the Americans were generally in agreement especially when it came to Afghanistan. There was a huge level of cooperation in Afghanistan: every European, with the exception of the far left, thought America had a right to go into Afghanistan. Everybody seemed to accept that because America was attacked. It was when the Americans shifted the war on terror to Iraq that the big gaps appeared: people were saying “why Iraq?” Fifty percent of the Americans agreed: it wasn’t so widely accepted. When 60% now support the war it’s because once our troops which are involved in combat, Americans generally tend to rally around. So the logic went: “OK, we didn’t want them to invade, but now we have troops there we want to win, we support the troops”. So that’s what happening now.

How much of the consternation in Europe do you think came from the problem with the UN, rather than Iraq itself?

KR: That was a huge part of it. Most people didn’t give a damn about Saddam Hussein – again with the exception of the far left who didn’t think you should attack another fellow country. Most governments and people here thought Saddam Hussein’s’ regime was pretty horrible, but they didn’t like the idea of America running around picking who they’re going to kick out. I think in retrospect the Europeans were right: with more of an international coalition the Americans wouldn’t have the problems they’re in now, where they’re all alone with the British, with not enough troops on the ground and the place is turning into chaos – while the world says: “well, that is not our problem”.

The Europeans were absolutely right about the idea of going through the UN. But in the other hand, they obviously would be in favor of doing that, because that’s where Europe has clout. Europe doesn’t really have any clout in any other institution but the UN: the militaries are relatively small, and except for the British they don’t really project power anywhere. The French have the second military in Europe but they are pretty far behind. Economically, they are a large humanitarian aid giver, but they are not as large as the US and the Japan. The way they have clout is through diplomacy – when you make things multilateral and go through the UN.

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Photo (illustration): BrunoInBaghdad.com

Photo (portrait):
Francesca Luk